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BEYOND THE VEIL?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE WOMEN'S CONVENTION IN THE
LAW AS STIPULATED IN SHARI'AH
Urfan Khaliq*
I. INTRODUCTION
A significant number of the world's population are subject to
torture, starvation, terrorism, humiliation, mutilation, and even murder
simply because they are female. Crimes such as these against any other
group would be recognized as a civil and political emergency, as well as a
gross violation of the victim's humanity.' Yet considering the seriousness
of the situation, it is often felt that these abuses receive far less publicity
and international attention than they demand. From its conception in the
aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations has attempted to
highlight some of the problems faced by women. The institutions set up to
tackle these problems have tended on the whole to be limited in their scope
and have not managed to break down the many factors which still cause
women to be treated as second class citizens, with limited rights and
opportunities. Thus with the passing of the United Nations Declaration for
Women2 in 1967, it was to be hoped that the attention of the international
political arena was finally addressing all the problems faced by women and
not simply the occasional highlighted problem that had come to the
* LLB, LLM: Faculty of Law, University of Southampton. This Article is based
upon a dissertation submitted to the University of Nottingham in part fulfillment
for the LLM in International Laws. The author would like to thank Professor
Christine Chinkin and Dr. Sebastian Poulter of the University of Southampton for
the useful comments and insights they provided. I would especially wish to express
my gratitude to Professor David Harris of the University of Nottingham who not
only supervised the original piece upon which this Article is based but also
commented upon a draft version of this paper. Any mistakes, are of course entirely
my own responsibility.
Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Re-vision of
Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486 (1990).
2 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
2263, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/6880 (1967).
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attention of the international community.
The Declaration triggered a chain of events causing the evolution
of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which was drafted and submitted to the General
Assembly of the United Nations 1979.1 The Women's Convention, which
has been described as the "definitive international legal instrument
requiring respect for the observance of the human rights of women",'
quickly entered into force and by the end of 1993 had over 130
ratifications5 -- even more than either of the two main United Nations
Human Rights treaties.' The majority of states who ratified the Women's
Convention were already party to the two main United Nations Human
Rights Treaties. Of those who ratificatified the Women's Convention,
however, a proportionally small number' came from countries which can
be classified as Islamic states.' Furthermore, those Islamic states that have
3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 43-46, at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1980). [hereinafter the Women's Convention]. The Women's Convention
entered into force on September 3, 1981.
4 Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 643 (1990).
' Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights:
Classifications and Status ofRatfications as of ] January 1994, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J
51, 64 (1994).
6 As of January 1, 1994, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 171 U.N.T.S. 999, had 125 ratifications compared to 127 for the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
3 U.N.T.S. 993. in Marie, supra note 5, at 56.
7 Seventeen Muslim states out of thirty five have ratified the Convention. This
represents 48% compared to a ratification percentage of 65% for all states. This
information was supplied by Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments
Relating to Human Rights: Classifications and Status of Ratifications as of 1
January 1994, supra n.5 and deduced the statistics by using the method found in
MUSLIM PEOPLES: A WORLD ETHNOGRAPHIC SURVEY 882-911 (Richard V. Weeks
ed., 2d ed, 1984), infra n.8.
8 The term "Islamic state" is slightly problematic. In the context of this Article it
will be used for those states which either have a Muslim majority greater than 70%,
or those states which are legally constituted as Islamic Republics. The former
category of states are included because the such a large Muslim population will
obviously be influential in the drafting of laws within that state. Of particular
importance is the legislation's relation to personal status which is of special
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signed the Convention have entered wide ranging reservations 9 regarding
some of the major substantive provisions in the treaty, using Shari'ah'0 as
a basis for justifying the continued subjection of women."
Because of the resurgence of Islamic movements, the position of
women living under Islamic laws has become of increasing importance in
recent years. Although it is commonly thought that the rise of Islamic
"fundamentalism" began to encroach on the international arena after the
"Islamic Revolution" in Iran in 1979, it can also be argued that the outbreak
of the Arab-Israeli Wars (particularly after 1967), has led Muslim
communities throughout the world to once again become highly aware of
their religious identity.' In recent years this "re-awakening" of religious
identity has led to a surge in the "Islamisation" of domestic laws in
countries such as Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Malaysia and Pakistan, and a
corresponding decline in the fortunes of women living under these regimes.
With Islam having become such a potent political and economic
force in the hands of oil rich leaders, who are no longer largely dependent
on Western aid to survive, the West can not expect to exert economic
power and influence to dictate to many Islamic countries their human rights
policies and practices. Instead, Western powers need to convince the
Islamic states of both, the legitimacy of the concept of human rights, and
relevance to the position of women with the regulations set out in considerable
detail in the Qur-an. Statistics from: MUSLIM PEOPLES: A WORLD ETHNOGRAPHIC
SURVEY 882-911 (Richard V. Weeks ed., 2d ed, 1984). The terms "Islamic states"
and "Muslim states" are used interchangeably.
9 For a list of factors why a state may not ratify a treaty, or why it may enter
reservations if it does ratify see Massimo Coccia, Reservations to Multi-Lateral
Treaties on Human Rights, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 19 (1985).
10 Although Shariah is often thought of as "Islamic Law" it is actually equivalent
to "Islamic Theology."
" Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq and Libya have all entered reservations to substantive
provisions using Shari'ah as a justification. Jordan, Tunisia and Turkey have
entered reservations to substantive provisions without actually mentioning Shari'ah
as ajustification. However, because the reserved Articles cover areas of the treaty
which conflict with Shari'ah as it is commonly interpreted, it seems likely that this
is the policy reasoning behind the decisions of the respective governments.
12 For an excellent assessment of "Islamic Fundamentalism" and its influence on
World politics, see M.H.A. Reisman, Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Impact on
International Law and Politics, in INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-34, (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).
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also, of the presence of these rights in Islamic jurisprudence. It is with this
background in mind that one must view the position of women in those
states which have adopted some form of Islamic law. 3 Throughout
centuries, Islam has been interpreted as giving women very few tangible
rights, especially in comparison to those rights now enjoyed by women in
the West. 4 The Women's Convention, therefore, appeared to offer to
women in Islamic countries an opportunity to achieve a greater degree of
freedom and autonomy, provided their governments not only ratified the
Convention, but also effectively implemented its provisions. Of those
Islamic states which did ratify the Convention, some, such as Indonesia,
did not enter reservations to the substantive provisions, while other states,
like Bangladesh and Egypt, entered very broad reservations to substantive
provisions. Of great debate for reservation, for instance, was Article 2,
which lays down many of the most important obligations undertaken by
contracting parties. 5 The problem of reservations to the Convention by
Islamic states, as highlighted by the Committee for the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has led to hostile exchanges in
the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations (ECOSOC) and
in the General Assembly 6 between the Islamic states and the West, with
"3 Officially, 17 states have declared Islam as the state religion. Syria and Egypt
now declare Shari'ah as the major source of law. Saudi Arabia follows Shari'ah
without significant revision. Most of the former Ottoman states -- Iraq, Jordan and
Libya- follow various codifications of Shari'ah. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia on
the whole follow their French based codes, using Shari'ah for personal status laws.
For a more in-depth analysis, see Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International
Human Rights Law in Islamic States,' 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 202,204 (1990).
14 For a comparative study of the rights enjoyed by women in Jahilyyah (pre-
Islamic times) and in Islam, as compared to the rights afforded to women in the
West, see Nayer Honarver, Behind the Veil!, 6 J.L. & RELIGION 355 (1988).
" Bangladesh's reservation to the entire Convention reads as follows: "The
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as binding
upon itself the provisions ofArticles 2, 13(a) and 16. 1 (c) and 09 as they conflict
with Shari'ah law as based on the Holy Qur-an and Sunnah." Egypt's reservation
to Article 2 reads as follows: "TheArab Republic of Egypt is willing to comply
with the content of this Article, provided it does not run counter to the Islamic
Shari'ah." Multi-Lateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, General
status as of 31 December 1991, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/10 (1991).
16 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 41/108, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No 53, at 170, U.N. Doc.
A/41/53 (1986).
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the Islamic states especially Bangladesh and Egypt, gaining considerable
support while accusing CEDAW of indulging in cultural imperialism. This
hostility has led to CEDAW withdrawing a request to the United Nations,
"to promote or undertake studies on the status of women under Islamic
laws and customs and in particular on the status and equality of women in
the family." 17
The aim of this Article is to look at both Shari'ah and the Women's
Convention to analyze if the alleged incompatibility between their
provisions actually exists, or if the alleged conflict is a fallacy advocated
for political purposes. It is not intended, however, to compare all of the
provisions of the Women's Convention with the position under Sharia.
Some of the issues which have been addressed by the Convention are of a
contemporary nature, on which no authentic Shari'ah position has been
advocated, while a clear Islamic authority can be found on others. This
Article will undertake an ascertation in two parts. First, this Article will
give a brief history of Islam, together with an analysis of the sources of
Shari'ah, in order to give the reader an understanding of Islamic society and
the context in which the provisions apply. Second, having provided the
background, the premise will then attempt to analyze the major substantive
provisions of the Women's Convention to see if they conflict with the law
as laid down in Shariah.
1 8
7 General Recommendation number 4 in CEDAW report during the sixth session.
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
U.N. GAOR 42nd Sess., 101st mtg. At 78, U.N. Doc. A/42/38 (1987). General
Recommendation number 4 in CEDAW report during the sixth session.
18 On the question of the incompatibility of the Islamic reservations to the
Women's Convention in relation to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
see Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the
Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'LL. 281,299 (1991);
Cook, supra note 4, at 688.
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H. ISLAM: A BRIEF HISTORY
Islam, which was bom out of the nomadic tribes of seventh century
Arabia, was conceived in a society which is known amongst Muslims as
Jahilyyah, (pre-Islamic times). The legal position afforded to women in this
society was no more than that of chattel, to be used or disposed of by men
as desired. Female infanticide, unlimited polygamy and the inheritance of
wives are widelly reported as having been practiced, although these
activites are deemed repugnant to Islam.19 Muslims believe that during the
period 644-656 A.D.2", the Prophet Mohammed received, through the
Archangel Gabriel, the literal word of God, which was eventually recorded
two to three centuries later, forming the sacred text of Islam, the Qur-an.
Great emphasis is placed by the Qur-an on the benefit of society as a
whole, in preference to the modem Western notion of rights for the
individual.21 According to the holy text, each and every person has a
specific role to play within society, and proper fulfillment of these roles
will benefit the entire society. The notion of inalienable individual rights,
as commonly advocated in the West, is unknown as a concept in Islam.
The one notable exception, are those rights which are owed to Allah. In
fact, while the Qur-an mentions numerous duties (farud), the few
references to rights (huquq), which do exist in the orthodox reading of the
Qur-an, can be better translated as "claims" rather than as rights.'
Great controversy now exists amongst Muslim academics as to
whether the Qur-an, as revealed in its entirety, was intended to be
applicable only to seventh century Arabia, like the Medina state model, or
whether it was to be abrogated wherever necessary in order to fit with the
conditions and circumstances of each and every society. While this
controversy lies outside the scope of this Article, it should be bome in mind
while studying the most repressive of Qur-anic provisions with regard to
"9 Various references exist in the Qur-an, where these practices are mentioned.
These references are listed as: Infanticide verse 81:8 and 81:9; Unlimited polygamy
verse 4:3; Inheritance of women/wives verse 4:19 and 4:23.
20 1 had previously listed the period as 570-610 A.D., however, I have now
come to the conclusion that this time scale is incorrect and that the Qur-an was
not recorded two to three centuries later but during the period 644-656 A.D.
There is no authoritative source for this information but it is very clear that the
vast amjority of Islamic scholars regard this time scale as the correct one.
21 On the question of the Western notion of rights, see RONALD M. DwoRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
' Arzt, supra note 13, at 206.
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while studying the most repressive of Qur-anic provisions with regard to
women. 23
H. NATuRE OF SHARIVAH
The founding jurists of Islamic jurisprudence in no way distinguished
between the religious, ethical or legal aspects of their work.24 To Muslims,
Shari'ah (which literally means the "path to follow"), is the "whole duty of
mankind," covering moral and pastoral theology, ethics, high spiritual
aspiration and detailed ritualistic and formal observance.' As such Shari'ah
is the general source of ethical and religious norms as well as of legal
principles and rules for Muslims. 26 Because Shari'ah does not recognize the
separation of "Church" and state as is largely advocated in the West, it
imposes on every aspect of a Muslim's life.
Due to its varied geographic coverage, however, from Senegal in
the West to Indonesia in the East, and from Mauritania in the South to
Central Asian former Soviet Republics in the North, Shari'ah has been
subject to a great number of variations through local and cultural
influences. Despite the existence of these local customary influences a very
large body of belief exists which is common to all Muslims.27 As Gellner
states;
For all the indisputable diversity, the
remarkable thing is the extent to which
Muslim societies resemble each other ....
[I]n the bulk of Muslim societies, in the
main Islamic block between Central Asia
and the Atlantic shores of Africa, one
feels that the same limited pack of cards
has been dealt. The hands vary but the
pack is always the same.28
23 The abrogation based view was first advocated in its most controversial form in
MAHMOUD MOHAMMED TAHA, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM (Abdullah A. An-
Na'im trans., 1987) and continued by his pupil Abdullah A. An-Na'im. It should
be noted that Taha was executed for apostasy for advocating these views in Sudan
in 1984.
24 Abdullah A. An-Na'im, Islamic Ambivalence to Political Violence, 31 GERMAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 315 (1988).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 In all likelihood, it would be impossible to differentiate "pure" Shari'ah from
customary influences.
2 Justin Leites, Modernist Jurisprudence as a Vehicle for Gender Role Reform in
the Islamic World, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 251,277 n. 95 (1991) (quoting
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My analysis of Shari'ah is based on this common body of belief. Where
significant differences exist in practice between the different schools of
thought, these will be pointed out. 9
A. Primary Sources Of Shari'ah
1. The Qur-an. The Qur-an, divided in to 114 Surahs (chapters)
with a total of 6,666 verses,3" is the primary source of Shari'ah. The text of
the Qur-an was revealed to the Prophet Mohammed by the Archangel
Gabriel, over a period of approximately twenty two years, according to the
circumstances at the time and as the situation so demanded.3' The legal
injunctions within the Qur-an, (Ayat-al-Ahkam) form the primary source
of Shari'ah, although it is hotly debated exactly how many verses within
the Qur-an amount to legal injunctions,32 in the true sense.33 The verses of
ERNEST GELLNER, MUSLIM SOCIETY 99, (1981)).
29 Although the there is commonly a differentiation made between the Sunni and
the Shi'ah traditions of Islam, the differentiation is not so clear cut or simple. Not
only do various schools exist within larger schools, but some sects which have
evolved within the Shi'ah tradition -- like the Ziydis of Yemen -- are in fact closer
in some of their practices to the Sunni school rather than the main bulk of the
Shi'ah tradition. The Sunni's who constitute the vast majority of the world's
Muslims are subject to four major schools of thought, which are named after the
founding Imam of each school. These schools are as follows : Hanbli (dominant
today in Saudi Arabia), Shaft (dominant in Indonesia and East Africa), Hanafi
(dominant in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Turkey and Egypt) and
Maliki (followed particularly in North Africa.). These references are to state what
is common knowledge. It is like stating that a majority of England's population
follow the Church of England and South America is mainly Catholic.
30 The version of the Qur-an which I have used is that translated by THE HOLY
QuR-AN: TEXT, TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARY, (Ustadh Abdullah YusefAli,
trans. 1938) (1989). This version of Qur-anic translations and commentaries has
now achieved the most widespread acceptance of all tafsirs (interpretations)
throughout the modem Muslim world.
1' ABDUR RAHMAN I. DoI, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW at 22 (1984).
32 The most widely agreed upon number of verses in the Qur-an is (aprox.) five
hundred. All Qur-anic verses will be referred to with the chapter number, followed
by the verse number.
11 Gamal M. Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relationship to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM.
J. COMP. L. 187, 188 (1978). Badr argues that only 190 verses out of 6,666 amount
to legal injunctions.
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the Qur-an, as a whole, differentiate between certain types of conduct,
classifying behavior into the following categories: Fard (a compulsory
duty, which is punishable ifit is omitted); Haram (an unlawful or forbidden
action, which is punishable); Mukruh (a disliked and disapproved action
but one which carries no penalty); Jaiz (a permitted action, but one which
is legally indifferent); and Maidub (an action which is rewarded, but whose
omission is not punishable)." These specific legal categories form the code
of conduct for every Muslim from birth until death." In many areas the
Qur-an lays down general principles and not specific injunctions. Where
these principles have been interpreted and elaborated upon by jurists, it
seems that they have reflected into these translations their own personal
biases and social conditions.
2. Sunnah [Hadith]. The second primary source of Shari'ah is the
Sunnah. The Sunnah are the sayings and the traditions of the Prophet
Mohammed, which illustrate examples of model behavior. The recorded
sayings of the Prophet which are used to explain and elaborate upon
injunctions, as set down in the Qur-an, are known as Hadith. Since the
Qur-an is viewed as the literal word of God, the Sunnah are deemed to be
of secondary importance in comparison, thus any reported Sunnah in
contradiction to a verse in the Qur-an, is discarded in favor of the Qur-anic
verse. The Sunnah is therefore supplementary to the Qur-an in aiding
explanation and interpretation. However, if the Sunnah is silent on the
interpretation of a Qur-anic verse, recourse may be had to the way the
verse was interpreted by the Sahaba (the companions of the prophet).3 6
Since the Hadith is by no means complete, and certain verses of the Qur-an
have no interpretation or explanation, the work of the Sahaba can be of
great importance in the interpretation of the Qur-an.
Neither the Hadith nor the Sunnah, as a whole, were recorded in
writing during the Prophet's life time, and the process of recording all the
Sunnah was not complete until approximately three centuries after the
Doi, supra note 30, at 50, 51.
I d. at 52.
36 Id at 46.
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death of the Prophet. 7 Despite the integrity of those involved, hearsay and
errors in interpretation must be accounted for in the writing. This is
evidenced by the fact that some reported Hadith were omitted when the
collections were made. The most widely respected versions of the Hadith,
in existence today, are those compiled by Imam Bukhari and by Imam
Muslim. A tradition has evolved whereby the writings of every individual
who compiled Hadith, have been collected, and the authenticity of each
incident and saying is decided by the repetition of that particular incident
in the work of all the compilers. Thus if a certain incident is mentioned
only once, no matter how eminent the recorder of the incident, a contrary
incident which has been recorded on more than one occasion will be given
preference, and is deemed to be of a more binding nature than the former.38
This process was used in the compiling of the Cononical Collection (Shah
Sittah)3 9 Strict criteria were laid down for the inclusion of Hadith in this
collection." Although the Hadith is generally regarded as being a fairly
accurate recording of the sayings and actions of the prophet, due to the
lapse in time between the actual events and their recordings, there still
exists a danger of mistakes and misrepresentations despite the elaborate
system set up to eradicate, the.41
Whereas the Qur-an and Sunnah are considered primary sources
of Shari'ah, the contribution of Al-jma, A-Qiyas and ljtihad can be
classified as secondary sources. A brief explanation of these sources
follows:
B. Secondary Sources of Shari'ah
1. ljtihad. ltihad, which literally means an effort or an exercise to
arrive at one's own judgment was a principle actively employed during the
formative stages of the development of Shari'ah. Scope for its exercise,
" Hadith were on the whole compiled in the period 240-303 A.H. (850-915 A.D.)
In this Article the terms Hadith and Sunnah will be used interchangeably. Most
scholars agree that this is correct.
38 An incident or saying which has been recorded only once, is deemed Ahad, and
is non-binding. Most scholars belive this to be correct.
19 This collection is seen as the most authentic representation of the Sunnah. Most
scholars believe that this information is valid.
40 For a list of the criteria, see Doi, supra note 30, at 55.
4' For details on this system, see Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutionalism and
the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 1, 4 (1992).
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however, was perceived as gradually diminishing as the founding jurists
developed general principles and specific rules based on the Qur-an and
Sunnah,2 between the ninth and tenth centuries. Due to their concern for
the sanctity of the sources which were being interpreted, Muslim jurists
insisted upon exceptionally high qualifications for persons who might be
authorized to exercise #Jtihad. Thus by the end of the twelfth century, with
the decline of the Abbasid Empire, a consensus had evolved that the "gates
of ljtihad' were to be closed, thereby disallowing it.43 This closure was
clearly based on political reasons, as there is no injunction of this nature in
the texts of the Qur-an or the Sunnah."
2. Al-jma. Jima, the consensus of the opinions of the Ullamah,45
which were given after the death of the Prophet, owes its origin to Surah
Nisaa 46 in the Qur-an. For a valid Ijma it is necessary to have not only
widespread consultation (Shu'ra), but also the use of juristic reasoning
(Ijtihad) before arrival at binding Ijam.47 It should be noted that great
controversy and disagreement exists between different schools as to many
of the conditions and criteria which must be satisfied for valid 1jam to be
issued by the process ofAl- jma.
3. Al- Qiyas. Al- Qiyas means analogy or analogical deduction. In
other words, Al-Qiyas is a legal principle, introduced in order to derive a
42 To a certain extent, jtihad is also based on the process of Qiyas, which will be
discussed shortly. For an extensive analysis of jtihad, see Bernard Weiss,
Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of ljtihad, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 199
(1978).
43 ASGHAR ALl ENGiNEER, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 6, 49 (1992).
Engineer states that the "gates ofljtihad' were closed in the twelfth century A.D.;
see also Doi, supra note 30, at 81. On the other hand, An-Na'im, supra note 23,
at 316., argues that the "doors of Ijtihad were closed in the tenth century.
"Ahmed Ali has noted that judges in Saudi Arabia are now exercising Ijtihad with
considerable discretion. This lends support to those who argue that the "gates of
jtihad' were never closed. Muhammed Ibrahim Ahmad Ahmed Ali & Abdul
Wahab Abu Salaiman, Recent Judicial Developments in SaudiArabia, 3 J. ISLAMIC
& COMP. L. 11, 12 (1969).
41 The Ullamah are the members of the Muslim community learned in the texts of
the Qur-an and Sunnah. Ullamah is an Arabic word. When translated it literally
means "learned ones."
46 Qur-an 4:115.
47 Doi, supra note 30, at 66. Ijam means precedent by this method.
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logical conclusion from a certain law on a certain issue that has to do with
the welfare of Muslims. In exercising this analogy, however, the logic must
be based on the Qur-an, Sunnah or Ima.48 Although the principle was
formally introduced by Imam Abu Hanifah, the founder of the Hanaft
school of Sunni thought, a great number of scholars do not agree with the
principle. 9 Qiyas, however, is widely used to apply Islamic principles to
the modem era. One example is the outlawing of intoxicating substances
such as marijuana or heroin, which although not specifically mentioned in
the Qur-an, produce the same intoxicating effect as alcohol."
If we are thus to look at the development of Shari'ah, as a whole,
apart from the Qur-anic injunctions and the Sunnah, it becomes
increasingly obvious that the Shari'ah is not immutable. It is largely man-
made regulations which can and should lawfully be challenged. Thus in this
analysis, any practice advocated by the Ullamah of any era, which is
regarded as contrary to Qur-anic injunctions or the Sunnah, will be
discarded in favor of the primary sources of Shari'ah. Undoubtedly, the law
as it has hitherto evolved through the processes of Qiyas, I#tihad and Ijma
and without the input of women jurists,51 has developed in such a way, that
all the interpretation, elaboration and clarification, work to the detriment
of women who live in Islamic societies.
C. Women in Shari'ah
1. An overview of commonly held beliefs. 2  In Islam there is
48 Doi, supra note 30, at 70.
49 SYED AMEER ALI, I MAHOMMEDAN LAW, 10 (7th ed. 1976 ). In fact, Qiyas
creates the differences between the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence.
SO It should be borne in mind that the principles of Istislah (public utility) and
Maslaha (public interest) should be invoked to ensure equitable decisions are
reached in all decisions by Qiyas. This is once again accepted as general practice
and knowledge.
1' It is widely recorded that women contributed to the intellectual thought that went
into the explanations and commentaries on Qur-ans in the Qur-an in the formative
stages of Islamic jurisprudence. Unfortunately, this practice fell in to disuse after
the death of the prophet. See 1 ABU HAMID AL-GHAZALI, IHYA'ULUM AD-DIN 50
(1 th Century, reprint Cairo 1939); cited by AI-Hibri, supra note 40, at 4.
52 This overview, which gives my understanding of the overall effects of some of
these injunctions, contains very few direct references to the sources of the religious
injunctions, as it is intended to investigate all these matters in greater detail later on.
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absolutely no difference between men and women as far as their
relationship with God is concerned. 3 Differences between men and women
are social in their context and relate to the family, its role and its functions.
In understanding the position of women in Islamic society, it needs to be
appreciated that the nuclear and extended family, particularly the former,
are viewed as the cornerstone and pillar of society, with Islam adopting a
perspective which sociologists would term: "functionalist." The family is
seen as vital for the conditioning of future generations of Muslims. The
status quo of society should not be disrupted, unless such action would be
for the benefit of the faith. Within this society, every individual has a
specific role to play and a function to fulfill. The role of women is
primarily that of child bearing, thereby producing future generations of
Muslims who will help to create a world in which Islam is the most
dominant force. 4
In line with this ideal of world domination, the concept of slavery
exists in traditional Shari'ah, but this seems to have been abrogated in an
age when slavery is no longer deemed acceptable. 5 It is submitted that the
abrogation of the verses on slavery 6 is a precedent for the abrogation of the
verses which prejudice women in an era when I feel such conduct is no
longer acceptable. 7 Within traditional Islamic society, religion, civil status,
age and gender are the criteria upon which the hierarchy is established
according to Shari'ah. Free mature male Muslims are accorded the greatest
number of civil and political rights, followed by free mature Muslim
women, with slave non-Muslim female minors having the least rights.
From this hierarchy it is evident that men are accorded a superior position
These commonly held beliefs are often incorrectly held by both Muslims and non-
Muslims alike as being based on the Qur-an.
s Many Verses in the Qur-an state this. These include Qur-an 16:97, and 33:35.
4 Women on the whole accept this sub-ordinate position not only due to a lack of
opportunity to break away from a subservient relationship, but also, because Islam
deems life on Earth as a test to see who will enter Paradise until eternity in the
afterlife. Women who fulfill their proper role on Earth will be rewarded for the
injustices they suffer in this life, with total bliss in the afterlife.
1s There do, of course, exist concepts which are very similar to slavery in
practice, such as the position of some bonded laborers and domestic workers.
56 In most tafsirs of the Qur-an slaves are referred to, "as those whom your right
hand possesses." See Qur-an 24:31.
17 The argument pertaining to the abrogation of the Qur-an shall be returned to and
examined at a later time.
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in society to women. This principle is generally accepted as originating
from Verse 34 of Chapter 4 of the Qur-an5 8 The civil and political rights
which are awarded to free Muslim males, unfortunately do not match up to
the modem Western conception of rights. 9 Likewise, the privileges
commonly afforded to women fall even shorter.
By virtue of the principle of guardianship of women established by
Verse 4:34 of the Qur-an, women are subject to a great deal of
discrimination in many areas including inheritance law, and their capacity
to act as witnesses.6' In addition, women are deemed to require
guardianship, due to what is perceived as their sexual irresponsibility. In
the Hadith references exist to the effect that if a male and female are left
alone the influence of the devil will emerge. 2 Women are thus often
portrayed as willing and encouraging partners in leading men "off the path"
which they are supposed to follow, by having sexual intercourse with them
outside wedlock, leading to illegitimate children and immorality in society,
which in turn leads to social unrest and a challenge to the Islamic way of
life. 3 A disruption of the status quo is therefore seen as unwelcome, as it
would necessitate a delay in the creation of Islam as the dominant force in
the world.
" Qur-an 4:34 actually reads: "Men are the maintainers of women, as Allah has
made some to excel others and as they spend out of their wealth (on women)."
" There is, for example, no notion of popular elections to choose political leaders,
as religious and political leaders are often one and the same.
60 The topic of Inheritance Laws under Qur-anic injunctions is not particularly
relevant to this discussion. For a very clear account of these laws, see JAMAL J.
NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS (1992). For further details on
Qur-an 4:34, see section on Family Law. See also, Qur-an 4:11.
61 Id See infra section on Civil Rights.
62 ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOi, WOMEN IN SHARU'AH at 147 (1989). [hereinafter: Doi:
Women]. It recalls a Hadith which states: "When a man and a woman sit alone
anywhere, Satan whose work is to beguile mankind, makes a third person."
63 This portrayal is one which is OFTEN presented by the jurists. The Qur-an and
Sunnah, however, see women as actually preventing men from straying from the
"true path." The verse which supports this proposition is 24:33 which obliges
chasity for the unmarried. There is also a Hadith recorded by Anas on this point,
which states "When a man marries he has fulfilled half of his religion, so let him
fear Allah regarding the remaining half." This hadith is reproduced in Doi: Women
in Shariah at 32. Doi argues that the prophet considered marriage for a Muslim as
half of his religion because it shields him from promiscuity, adultery and
fornication, which may lead to other evils.
BEYOND THE VEIL?
Discrimination against women is also commonly practiced in other
areas. Men may, for example, marry up to four wives at any one time'4 and
divorce them at will, without having to account to any earthly authority,
whereas women can only marry one male at any given time, and must
satisfy strict criteria if they are to seek a judicial divorce. If a man does
divorce his wife, he is only liable to pay her maintenance for her next three
menstrual periods,6" a period known as idaat. Although it is clearly
stipulated that this is a minimum requirement, maintenance is very rarely
(if ever) paid beyond this period. Abuses of the status and rights afforded
to women in Islamic society are so widespread that women are often not
even afforded the rights which are specifically laid down in the Qur-an.
These abuses will become glaringly apparent when we start to compare the
Articles in the Women's Convention with the provisions of Shari'ah and
the national legislation which has been laid down as supposed
interpretations of it.
IV. THE WOMEN'S CONVENTION
A. A Brief Overview
The text of the Women's Convention, which aims to eliminate all
discrimination against women, does not follow the format of its
predecessor, the Declaration on Women, but tends to mirror the format of
the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,' several phrases of which are also echoed in the 1979
Convention. 7 The one area where the Women's Convention deviates
markedly from the Race Convention, however, is in the preamble, which
6 Muslim men may marry women who are deemed Al-e- Kithab. This literally
means "people of the book," meaning those faiths which have a divinely sent
scripture. This is often equated with the Christian and Jewish faiths. Muslim
women, however, are restricted to marrying only Muslim men. Both Muslim men
and women can, however, marry someone who has converted to Islam without any
restrictions.
65 If a woman is pregnant, she will receive maintenance until she has completed
three menstrual periods after the pregnancy.
66 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, openedfor signature, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
67 Noreen Burrows, The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 32 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 419, 421 § 3 (1985).
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includes amongst its aims the eradication of apartheid, colonialism and
interference in domestic affairs, in addition to noting how a new economic
order would help to eradicate discrimination against women. 8
The actual substantive provisions of the Convention are split into
various categories and for clarity these classifications will be used here.
Part I of the Convention contains the opening provisions which deal with
the definition of discrimination,69 a statement of obligations undertaken by
contracting parties, 70 an obligation upon state parties to "take appropriate
measures" to modify social and cultural patterns, 71 and an obligation upon
state parties to put a halt to the traffic in women and the exploitation of
women.
72
The definition of discrimination as contained in Article 1, does not
simply seek the elimination of discrimination on the basis of sex but rather
that which adversely affects women. The Women's Convention thus
prohibits behavior where there is
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis
of sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status on a basis of
equality of men and women .... of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.
This provision, therefore, applies to a wide range of activities with
both unintentional and intentional discrimination being prohibited, in
addition to private as well as public actions being regulated with the "any
other field" clause.73 While Meron displays concern about this, considering
that it may lead to a violation of privacy rights of the individual and
68 Id at 423, Burrows, however, argues that the presence of this provision should
come as no surprise, as the UN's Decade for Women (1976-1985) was inextricably
linked with the questions of development and peace within the United Nations.
69 Women's Convention, art. 1.
70 Id. art. 2
71 Id. art. 5
72 Id. art. 6
73 THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIoNS 60
(1986).
BEYOND THE VEIL?
conflict with the principles of freedom of opinion, expression and belief,"'
Zearfoss considers the "any other field" clause to be "uniquely important"
as it is the area of private relations where women are furthest from
attaining equality,75 and thus suggests the clause is an important
breakthrough in relation to the emancipation of women.
In addressing all forms of discrimination, the Women's Convention
is intended to be comprehensive by recognizing that women are not only
subject to specific inequalities but that they are also subject to pervasive
forms of discrimination, woven in to the social structure.76 This has
important implications for Islamic states where the Islamic legal system is
the infrastructure upon which the social system is based.
Articles 7-9, which constitute the second part of the Women's
Convention, cover those rights which can be deemed civil rights per se.77
These Articles deal with political rights,7" the right to work in international
organizations79 and nationality rights."0 Articles 10-14 constitute Part III of
the Convention and deal with those rights which can be classified "social
and economic rights." Part IV of the Convention covers only two Articles,
namely Articles 15-16. Article 15 deals with equality for women in all legal
aspects while Article 16 deals with the specific issue of equality for
women, in the sphere of family relations and especially marriage. Parts V
and VI of the Convention contain the provisions which set up the
Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and
other administrative matters, along with the concluding provisions of the
Convention.
B. The Main Substantive Provisions of the Women's Convention
and Their Conflict With Shari'ah
74 Id. at 62.
71 Sarah C. Zearfoss, Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Reasonable, Radical or Reactionary?, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903, 908
(1991).
76 Cook, supra note 4, at 670. The Convention is not, however, comprehensive and
does not address many issues.
I The categories used to label the various provisions within the Convention such
as "Civil Rights" in this instance and "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" for
Articles 10-14 are taken from Burrows, supra note 67.
78 Women's Convention, art. 7.
79 Id. art. 8.
80 Id. art. 9.
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1. Opening Provisions of the Convention. Article 2 of the Women's
Convention, which substantially reproduces the language of the Race
Convention, obliges parties to undertake to implant the principle of non
discrimination in their constitution, or in other legislation, and to ensure the
practical implementation of the principles, and also to adopt legislation,
including sanctions, prohibiting discrimination against women. Under
Article 2 states are also obliged to establish legal protection for the rights
of women, including the creation of legal institutions to ensure effective
legal protection, and to abolish existing laws (including national penal
provisions), which constitute discrimination against women. Many of the
Islamic states which ratified the Convention entered reservations to this
Article. The extent of the reservations to the fundamental obligations was
such that it has been hotly debated whether a reservation to this Article is
in violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.8' The reason
advocated by the Islamic states for their reservations to Article 2 is its
incompatibility with Shari'ah. Whether this incompatibility actually exists
will become apparent during the remainder of the discussion. The
incongruity can clearly be demonstrated by examining the areas of
discrimination against women which have been outlawed by the
Convention, and the response of the Islamic states to these provisions.
2. Elimination of Prejudicial Customary Practices. One of the
areas tackled by the Convention relates to the elimination of prejudicial and
customary practices which are based on the idea of women's inferiority. 2
With regard to customary practices in Islamic states, often where a custom
existed before the spread of Islam and needed to be continually justified,
then it was given a religious significance so as to legitimize its
continuance. The supposed obligation to follow this practice soon became
so deeply entrenched, that the customary practice was hardly ever
questioned as it was incorrectly thought that a challenge to the practice
would amount to questioning the word of God -- an act equivalent to
apostasy. The most obvious example of this problem in relation in to
women is the totally indefensible practice of female genital mutilation. In
parts of Africa, this practice widely spread amongst the Muslim population.
No Qur-anic verse or any recorded Hadith can possibly be used to justify
8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
See also note 18 above.
82 Women's Convention, art. 5.
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the practice, yet it is continually carried out on supposed Qur-anic
justifications, which are advocated by men literate and knowledgeable in
the Qur-an to a female population, the vast majority of whom cannot
understand Arabic
3 let alone read it.
8 4
The most significant customary practice in Islamic societies which
reinforces the inferiority of women, and for which some justification can
be found in Shari'a, is the compulsory dress code (hijaab), which women
must observe. Although this obligation does not seem to be based on a
perceived inferiority of women, a major justification for the imposition of
purdah5 is the sexual irresponsibility of women. Hence the dress code is
instituted not only to make women less attractive to men, but also, to
seclude them from men, thereby removing the opportunity for illegal sexual
intercourse.
Until the Iranian revolution, adopting purdah had largely been the
individual choice of Muslim women, but since 1979 many Islamic nations
have followed in the footsteps of Iran, by compelling women to observe
hyaab in the public sphere. 6 Although substantial disagreement exists
amongst Muslim scholars to the exact extent to which women must cover
their bodies while in the public sphere, the requirement to wear a veil
across the face is now almost universally accepted as merely being a
customary influence, for which there is no justification in the Qur-an or
Sunnah.17 Verse 24:31 of the Qur-an which is the most important verse
83 The Qur-an was originally recorded in, and is still traditionally read in, Arabic.
14 For a discussion on the concept of female circumcision, see Allison T. Slack,
Female Circumcision : A Critical Appraisal,' 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 437 (1988);
Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World - Traveling and MultiCultural
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
189, (1991-1992).
s Purdah is the seclusion of women from men.
86 Purkah is the all-enclosing black dress and head scarf, which has now become
the norm for many women in the Islamic world. Women who wear a purkah in
the public sphere are commonly viewed as complying with the requirements of the
hyaab.
11 Keddie notes that the earliest reference to veiling comes from an Assyrian text
of about 1200 B.C. prohibiting the veiling of prostitutes. This has been construed
to mean that veiling is a symbol of respectability. She continues by arguing that
veiling is not a Muslim phenomenon, rather, the evidence is overwhelming that the
early Muslims adopted this practice from the peoples they conquered. Nikki R.
Keddie, The Rights of Women in Contemporary Islam, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
WORLD'S RELIGIONS 76, 78 (Leroy S. Rouner ed. 1986 ).
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dealing with dress code, stipulates modest dress for both men and women,
but it is women who are asked to "draw their veils over their bosoms, " 8 in
the company of strange men, due to the sexual nature of their figures and
not men who are told to conduct their behavior in such a manner where
women would not feel threatened. 9 This is not, however, the only verse in
the Qur-an which deals with dress for women. Verses 32-33 of Chapter 33
lay down certain stipulations which many jurists deem applicable to all
women, such as women ideally being confined to the four walls of the
home, as part of their seclusion, but if one reads the text of the verses it can
be seen that these verses only apply to the "wives of the prophet." Apart
from these verses, the only other references in the Qur-an concerning dress
refer to the observance of modesty at all times in front of those outside the
mahram relationship.9 There do, however, exist certain well known
Hadith, which deal with dress, the most important of which for our
purposes is where the Prophet is reported to have said, "When a woman
reaches puberty, no part of her body should remain uncovered except her
face and the hand up to the wrist joint. "9 Thus, if this Hadith is accurately
recorded, and no reason exists to question its authenticity, it is difficult to
support the arguments of reformists who argue that the hifaab is the
invention of jurists, when its origins can be seen to lie in the Sunnah and
some translations of Qur-anic verses.
Although none of the Islamic states entered a reservation directly
to Article 5, it can clearly be seen that the imposition of the hijaab is due
to the perceived inferiority of women. Women are told to dress modestly,
as are men, but any immorality or lascivious attitudes by men are attributed
to a flouting of the norms of modesty and dress by women. The imposition
of purdah and the stipulations which have to be met, are not as strict,
however, as many members of today's Ullamah would have us believe.
There is no prohibition on speaking in public for instance, nor a
1 The actual Arabic word used for "veil" is "khimaar.", Hamma, however, claims
that khimaar as the ancient Arabic practice, entails covering of the head and face,
and thus the practice of covered heads and veiled faces has its origins in Qur-anic
injunctions and-is not only the work of male jurists. UMMU HAMMA, IN SUPPORT
OF HIJAAB 4 (1990). It would appear, however, that this is not an universally
accepted interpretation.
89 Although men are asked to lower their gaze in verse 24:30 of the.
91 A mahram relationship exists between persons to whom marriage is forbidden.
For women, therefore, it would include sons, fathers, grand-children and brothers.
91 Doi: Women, supra note 62, at 14.
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compulsion to wear a veil to cover the face, nor is there a requirement to
be confined to the four walls of the house, which was intended only to
apply to the wives of the Prophet. It is clear, however, that women cannot
be afforded equality with men in this sphere, without damaging the spirit
of the relevant text, or without taking the Hadith out of their correct
context.
3. Political Rights in the Convention and Shari'ah. Political
rights of women are dealt with in Articles 7 and 8 of the Women's
Convention. Article 7 expands upon the provisions laid down in the 1952
Convention on the Political Rights of Women,92 by ensuring women the
right not only to vote in an election, but also to stand for election to all
publicly elected bodies and to hold public office in any area concerned with
the public and political life of the country, on an equal basis with men. The
right to represent government in the international sphere is specifically
provided for in Article 8. Although once again, none of the Islamic states
entered a reservation in direct relation to these Articles, there does seem to
be an apparent conflict between Shari'ah and these provisions.
The main source of prejudice in Shari'ah against women entering
the political sphere, emanates from a Hadith recorded by Abu Bakrah
which claims that when the Prophet Mohammed was told of a woman
leader having been appointed in Persia, he commented, "A nation will never
prosper if it is led by a woman."93 This Hadith, in conjunction with Verse
4:34 of the Qur-an and the commonly advocated position regarding
seclusion for women, has led the Ullamah through the ages, to justify the
barring of entry for women to any position where they may possibly
exercise authority over men, or even associate with men outside of the
family -- especially in the political arena.
While the concept of universal suffrage is alien to Shari'ah, due to
secular pressures which were present after the colonialist era, the majority
of Muslim states which gained independence were set up as democracies.
To maintain the predominately male grasp on power in those states,
however, Abu Bakrah's Hadith suddenly came to the forefront of political
discussions, and was especially prominent in the denouncing of Benazir
Bhutto's first period in office, as the prime minister of Pakistan as un-
Islamic.
I Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Dec. 20, 1952, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
93 MUIHAMMED SHARIF CHAUDHRY, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN ISLAM 167 (1991).
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The perspective where women are seen as incompetent and unable
to perform political work, is refutable on several grounds, which are
present within Islamic jurisprudence and reasoning. As has already been
shown, the imposition of the all enclosing purkah and the supposed total
seclusion of all women, is due to misinterpretation and not laid down in
either the Qur-an or Sunnah. This, however, still leaves the issue of the
derogatory Hadith to be resolved. In fact, considerable doubt seems to exist
whether this Hadith is actually genuine, or at least recorded in the correct
context. As mentioned earlier, personal bias will obviously play a role in
the recording of an event, even by a truthful person. More significantly,
though, this Hadith is actually anAhad, (an event which has been recalled
by only one of the Prophet's companions and thus non-binding.) In addition
to this, a Hadith contradictory to the aforementioned also exists. This
Hadith as recorded by AI-Ghazali shows that women participated in public
debates on the running of the Medina state.94 Since this state model is the
ideal to which Muslims tend to aspire, it is interesting to note that very few
Islamic states have adopted this approach by allowing women to voice their
opinions or make their presence felt. But perhaps even more significant
than this, is the fact that the alleged Hadith which is derogatory towards
women, is in direct conflict with some Qur-anic verses. Surah 27 of the
Qur-an talks in a glowing light of the Queen of Sheba, recording not only
her competence, but also her great wisdom, a quality many of the Ullamah
feel women, due to their biological makeup cannot possess. Arguably, if
the Islamic faith disapproved of women leaders, the Queen of Sheba would
not have been portrayed in such a glowing light in the Qur-an itself.
Chaudhry adds further credibility to the Qur-anic based argument, that no
prohibition exists in Shari'ah against women leaders and politicians, by
noting how the Qur-an records and stipulates in the most intricate detail the
ethics, values and even manners which a Muslim should follow."
Following this line of reasoning, it seems incomprehensible that if women
leaders were deemed Haram or even Mukruh, that the Qur-an would not
have said so. According to Chaudhry, silence on the issue means that the
decision of allowing women leaders as politicians, is one for the Muslim
community to decide, according to how their interests would best be
served. This argument is further strengthened by the Indian theologian
Shehab who notes that Imam Malik, the founder of the Maliki school of
94 A1-Hibri, supra note 40, at 25.
9 Chaudhry, supra note 93, at 175.
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thought, expressed the opinion that a woman can be the head of state in all
of its affairs.' It is, for example, long established in Maliki spheres, that a
woman may be a Qadi (judge), yet it does not appear to be implemented in
practice. Despite this dictum which should bind at least the Maliki school,
a widespread consensus seems to exist amongst the Ullamah, of all of the
Sunni and Shi'ah schools of thought, that women cannot lead a Muslim
state.
This position, however, has not prevented some Islamic states such
as Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan extending the franchise to women, with
Bangladesh having a specific provision which guarantees women a certain
number of seats in its parliament.97 These measures have on the whole been
passed with little or no trouble, except from the most conservative and
repressive elements of the Ullamah. Other Islamic states, however,
specifically exclude women from the right to vote, on so-called "Islamic"
principles. It is clear though, that despite these practices, there is no
prohibition in the Qur-an or any reliable Sunnah which would prohibit
women from leading a nation or becoming a member of an elected body in
an Islamic country and thus, no conflict should exist in this sphere between
the Women's Convention and Shari'ah.
4. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Shari'ah and the
Women's Convention
a. The Right to an Education. The right affording women
an education on par with men, provided in Article 10 of the Convention is
one of the most important provisions within this category of rights. This
provision is vital if women are to free themselves of man-made constraints
upon their autonomy. As Burrows states: "The right to equality of treatment
in the educational sphere is perhaps the most important of all the cultural
rights afforded to women because without it, women are unable to make
use of their rights at work, in public life or in the home."98
The text of the Convention can be interpreted to allow for the
segregation of sexes, something which Islamic teachings would require, but
segregation would only be permissible under the terms of the Convention,
96 Rafullah Shehab, Mansab-e-Hukoomat aur Musalman Aurat at 174 (1976). This
book was originally written in Urdu, and translated by the author.
97 Sigma Huda, Bangladeshi Women and Development, HUM. RTS. Q., Summer
1981, at 82.
98 Burrows, supra note 67, at 435.
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if both male and female education establishments provided exactly the
same standard and type of education. Even if an identical standard of
education for both sexes was provided, it does not seem likely that an
education system established upon Islamic principles, would advocate
equality of the sexes, to those pupils in attendance at those institutions, thus
defeating one of the requirements of the Convention. Many Islamic states
do have a segregated educational system and statistics demonstrate that the
allocation of educational resources is clearly partial to the male population.
A sample of five Islamic states which provide segregated schooling showed
that, on average, twice as many males as females are actually literate.99
This differentiation is explicable in light of the fact that Muslim families
traditionally seem to place far greater emphasis on male education and
learning than that of females. Yet a Hadith clearly states "Acquisition of
knowledge is obligatory for every male andfemale. " °It appears, therefore,
that despite the fact that no prohibition exists in Shari'ah against women
gaining an education, in Islamic societies, there is a far greater emphasis
on the education of males than females. For example, in commenting upon
Bangladesh's third periodic report submitted under Article 18 of the
Convention, it was stressed by CEDAW that there was a prevalent feeling
in Bangladesh that since women, "go off' to be married and men are
expected to look after the family, the emphasis on male education is
justifiable."' Also in the report submitted by Yemen, the government
representative stressed that despite the increased government provision for
female education, the state could not force parents to send their daughters
to school.1°2 This, to some extent illustrates the fact that although no actual
conflict exists between the provisions of Shari'ah in this respect and the
19 In Saudi Arabia 44% of the male population are literate compared to 19% of
women. The figure in Pakistan is 44% to 22%, while in Algeria it is 69% to 33%.
Egypt has a female literacy rate of 30% compared to 59% for the male population,
while in Iran 39 % of females are literate compared to 62% of males. It is revealing
to bear in mind, that elementary education is compulsory with the exception of
Pakistan, for all in these states. Riane Eisler, Human Rights: Towards an Integrated
Theoryfor Action, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 287,299 (1987).
'o Doi: Women, supra note 62, at 138.
101 Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of Bangladesh. CEDAW/C/BGD/3.
April 8, 1993.
102 Yemen: Initial and Second Periodic Report. CEDAW/C/1993/L.1/Add.12.
February 3, 1993. Yemen's report was considered by the committee to be one of
the most comprehensive and frank of all the reports that had been submitted.
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requirements of the Women's Convention, women face an uphill struggle
if they are to change attitudes and gain the resources necessary to obtain an
education of comparable quality to that received by the male population in
their states.
b. The Right to Work The right to paid employment on
equal terms with men, which is bestowed upon women by Article 11 of the
Convention, attempts to eliminate all manner of discriminatory practices
against women in the employment field, and to promote protective labor
legislation. In comparison with the position advocated by the Convention,
in some Islamic countries, especially the Persian Gulf states, women are
still actively seeking the right to be employed in work of their choice.
Where women are permitted to seek employment, restrictions are placed
upon them which are designed to maintain a segregation of the sexes at the
work place.103 Thus where women are allowed to work in the public arena,
they tend to work as gynecologists, pediatricians, obstetricians and
elementary school teachers; or else in other professions where there is little
or no contact with men. So it is not that women cannot work, rather, it is
that this permission only exists in cases of necessity.
The actual restrictions on the working of women as found in the
Qur-an and Sunnah, are in fact more sympathetic in allowing women to
work than the legislation that has been implemented in many states on
supposedly Islamic grounds. Verse 4:32 of the Qur-an clearly states that
women are entitled to keep whatever they may earn, thus implying that
women may earn. Because income may be earned through investments
such as real estate, it is necessary to seek verses which either expressly
forbid or permit labor outside the home for women. Although no such Qur-
anic verses exists, there is, on point, a Hadith recited by Hazrat Aisha, one
of the Prophet's wives. The Hadith recorded that Suiddah bint Zammah
was granted permission by the Prophet to go out and work during her
period of idaat,0 4 because her needs so required. If women are permitted
to go out to work during their period of idaat, (provided that there is a
need), then it is impossible for the position to be as restrictive as the
103 RIcHARD F. NYRoP ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA 23 (1977).
Extracts re-printed in James Dudley, Human Rights Practices in the Arab States:
Modern Impact ofShari'ah Values,' 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 55, 81-83 (1982).
104 Idaat is the period of seclusion which a wife must observe on divorce from or
the death of her husband. See section on Family Law for further details.
105 Doi: Women, supra note 62, at 149.
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modem Ullamah advocate.
Although this stance, which permits women to go out to work if
their needs so require may seem fairly liberal compared to the position in
many Islamic states today, it must be borne in mind that if women do go
out to work, they must do so within the framework of modesty which they
are required to observe. It is also important to remember that Islam views
the family as the focus of a wife's duties. Therefore, if a married woman
wishes to seek work, it would in all likelihood have to be without prejudice
to her family's rights over her and to her obligations towards her family.
Doi, for example, argues that a wife must seek permission from her
husband before she can seek employment."0 6 If a wife does go out to work
against the wishes of her husband, the majority of jurists from both the
Sunni and Shi'ah tradition have ruled that the husband has the right to
withhold maintenance to the wife during this period.10' In fact this position
has been expressly adopted in modem Jordanian and Syrian legislation,0 8
although there is no justification for this in either the Qur-an or Sunnah.
The rights afforded to women by the primary sources of Shari'ah, in this
sphere, reflect the mainly patriarchal stance prevalent in all Islamic society,
where women can only go out to work if there is a dire need to do so, and
if their going out to work does not infringe on their obligations towards
their families. This is clearly in conflict with the position envisaged by the
Women's Convention. Ironically though, fervent advocates of modem
Shari'ah such as Bangladesh, who entered reservations using Shari'ah as
ajustification in other areas of the Convention, did not enter reservations
to this Article. It is probable that the reason for Bangladesh's "consent" to
the Article is due to the fact that female labor is of great important ot its
national economies, ,o9 hence displaying the double standards and hypocrisy
of the politics in some of these states.
5. Civil Rights. Article 15 of the Convention focuses on a number
of areas where women have traditionally been subject to discriminatory
treatment, including equality for women with men before the law. Much
national legislation supposedly based on Shari'ah, represents the greatest
obstacle to women attempting to achieve equality with men in this
106 Id. at 147.
107 JAMAL L. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIc LAW AND MODERN
ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 62 (1990).
108 Id.
109 Huda, supra note 97, at 78.
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sphere."'
In courts based on a Shari'ah code, little prejudice, if any, exists if
a wrong is committed against a female. On the whole, the incident is
treated in exactly the same way as if the victim were a male."' The major
problem, however, for women striving for equality with men, concerns the
validity and worth of their testimony in a court of law. The primary source
of this prejudice is Verse 2:228 of the Qur-an which reads:
0 ye who believe!




And get two witnesses
Out ofyour own men.
And if there are not two men,
Then a man and two women,
Such as ye choose,
For witnesses,
So that if one them errs.
The other can remind her.
From this verse, male jurists have concluded two female witnesses
are equivalent to one male witness, at all times. Yet if one were to look
at the context of the verse, it can be seen that this is true only in the
conducting of business affairs. The irony of the matter, however, is that
while women are permitted to conduct their own business affairs both
110 Although during the drafting of the Convention, it was the fourth paragraph of
Article 15 which provided the greatest difficulty to the Islamic states. This
paragraph which allows women equal rights in choosing the residence and domicile
of the family was seen as contradictory to the teachings of Islamic Law by the
Egyptian delegate. Similar concerns were expressed by the delegates representing
Indonesia and Iran respectively. U.N. ESCOR, 26th Sess., 650th mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doe E/CN.6/SR.650 (1976).
"' The one exception to this, is the payment of diaat (blood money) as a form of
compensation. In traditional practice, the divaat of a female is half of that payable
to a male. For an account of how diyaat has been applied in modem national
legislation, see Evan Gottesman, The Re-Emergence of Qisas and Diyaat in
Pakistan, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 433 (1992).
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before and after marriage, they are seen as na'fve and suffering from a lack
of understanding. Naturally, this restricts women's ability to witness their
own business transactions on an equal footing with men.
The Ullamah, while deciding that two female witnesses are the
equivalent of one male witness in all spheres, have in their infinite wisdom
totally ignored seven other Qur-anic verses which are concerned with the
recording of evidence, none of which differentiate between the value of
male and female witnesses."2 Interestingly, the Ullamah have also held that
the testimony of a woman is inadmissible as evidence in the trial of crimes
which are classified as Hudood.3 Yet "no bar exists in the Qur-an or
Hadith, against the evidence of a woman, or her being a competent witness
without the presence of a male."" 4 Considering the fact that all the Islamic
schools accept the notion that, "that which is not forbidden is permissible,"
the inadmissibility of the evidence of women in Hudood trials illustrates
the extent to which authentic Islamic doctrines have been manipulated by
the Ullamah, so that they may reflect their own prejudices. This is not to
say, however, that the position in the Qur-an and Sunnah is one of
impartiality. The conflict with the provisions of Article 15 of the Women's
Convention is apparent. Nevertheless, it is pertinent that of the Islamic
states, only Turkey entered a reservation to this Article. Almost all the
other Islamic signatories have enacted total equality in this sphere in their
112 JUSTICE AFTAB HussAiN, STATUS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 278, (1987). lists all
seven Qur-ans with their various translations, and illustrates beyond reasonable
doubt, that in all spheres other than business transactions, the testimony of a female
is equivalent to that of a male.
"I Crimes classified as Hudood are those for which the punishment is laid down
in the Qur-an or Sunnah. This inadmissibility of the evidence of women is the
reason for the gross miscarriages ofjustice which are taking place against women.
For example, women who are victims of rape cannot give evidence in their own
trials. Thus, unless the crime is witnessed by other persons, sufficient to satisfy the
Qadi that there was no consent, the woman is seen as having committed a crime of
zina. (immorality) Pakistan's Ordinance of Hudood Number VII for example,
makes the evidence of women expressly inadmissible in such cases. This has led
to cases such as the infamous Safia Bibi case, where a blind woman who was raped
was convicted for zina, when she could not identify her assailant. For further
information on this area, see Rubya Mehdi, The Offense ofRape in the Islamic Law
of Pakistan, 18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 19 (1990).
114 This is, infact, part of the ratio from a Pakistani case, FIDA HUSSAIN v. NASEEM
AKHTAR, 1977 PLD 328 (Pak.) decided in the Lahore High Court. Despite this
judgment, the Hudood Ordinance, id. is still valid. Hussain, supra note 112, at 271.
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national legislation, despite the traditional Shari'ah stance being one of
bias.
6. Family Law. A number of commentators see the inclusion of
Article 16, a provision covering the family even in the most general terms,
as something of a breakthrough in the international recognition of women's
rights."5 When the draft form of this provision was presented to the Islamic
states during discussions in the Third Committee of the General Assembly,
it was found to be objectionable, and thus these states formed a lobby
which attempted to amend the Article to conform with the principles of
Islamic law.16 Although some amendments were made, the Islamic states
have still made heavy reservations to this provision" 7, leaving women in
these states in danger of suffering discrimination in the most personal and
threatening sphere of their lives.
a. The Marriage Relationship Under Shari'ah. Marriage,
which is sometimes regarded as protection from unchaste behavior, is an
obligation upon every Muslim, and excused only if an extreme financial or
physical condition prevents them from carrying out the responsibilities
which marriage expects."' Before the marriage is contracted, various
stipulations must be met. Both parties to the marriage must have reached
the age of puberty" 9 and be of sound mind, in addition to there being un-
coerced consent in agreeing to the marriage. However, due to the nature
of Islamic society, perhaps the most desired requirement of the unmarried
woman is that she still possesses her virginity.
20
115 Burrows, sitpra note 67, at 450.; Hillary Charlesworth et al., Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
613, 636 (1991), criticize not only the Women's Convention, but all human rights
treaties for preserving the family rather than recognizing it as the unit through
which women are subject to violence and abuse.
116 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/34. SR., at 70-73.
"11 Andrew C. Byrne, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 54 (1989).
118 JOHN L. EsposITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 15 (1982).
119 The age of puberty differs between the various schools. It tends to range from
twelve for boys and nine for girls in three schools, and fifteen for both parties in
the Hanafi school.
120 Qur-an 24:33 of the specifically obliges chastity for the unmarried. When the
marriage is being contracted, a Mahr (dower) is to be fixed. This dower is to be
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The actual marriage (nikkah) is only religious in the sense that it
allows an individual to achieve the essence of Islam, spreading the faith by
legally having children. A nikkah is in fact regulated by the laws which
govern civil contracts. Therefore, in order for this contract to be valid,
there must be an offer, and an acceptance -- witnessed by two persons.12'
A practice, influenced by local customs and endorsed by jurists, has
evolved in the Hanafi school whereby a wali (guardian) can arrange an
individual's future marriage, but this practice is not supported in either the
Qur-an or Sunnah. The Convention for its part expressly stipulates in
Article 16(1) that both parties entering the marriage relationship freely
consent to the union, thus it would appear that no conflict should exist
between Shari'ah and the Convention with regard to this provision.2
Article 16(1) of the Convention stipulates that discrimination
against women must be eliminated in all matters. Thus the Qur-anic verse
which permits polygamous marriages for men, but does not offer similar
options for women, would be in contradiction to this clause. In essence,
this would eliminate the inferior positions of women who are all married
to the same individual. The actual verse which is cited as allowing a
Muslim male up to four wives is, taken out of context and abused in
practice. Verse 3:4 of the Qur-an allows an individual to have up to four
wives, but only if he can treat all his wives equally and love all of them in
the same way to the same degree. This verse must be read in conjunction
with Verse 4:129 of the Qur-an, which states that no man can do equal
justice to all his wives, "even if it is his most ardent desire.""m A leading
paid to the bride to be at some stage. The Mahr acts as a form of consideration for
the wife and its purpose is to provide the wife with some money in case the
marriage dissolves. For an in-depth analysis of the concept of Mahr, see Doi, supra
note 30 at 158.
121 Qur-an 2: 282.
1 Under Hanafi law, it is possible for a marriage contracted under duress to be
valid, if it is contracted by a guardian on behalf of his minor ward. The marriage
is voidable on the ward's attainment of puberty if there has been no voluntary
consummation of the marriage. There is, however, no justification for this practice
in the Qur-an or Sunnah and this must be seen as a customary practice.
123 Sir Norman Anderson, Islamic Family Law, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 67, Volume IV (1983) argues that to
comply with this Qur-an, a man does not have to love his wives equally, but simply
spend his nights equally with all of them.
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reformist commentator on the Qur-an, Parvez, 124 has convincingly argued
that since the verses on polygamy were revealed after the Battle of Uhad,
in which over ten percent of the Muslim male population were slain,
leaving large numbers of orphans and widows, it is only in circumstances
such as these, that polygamy is allowed. Monogomy, however, is still a
Qur-anic ideal. Parvez further argues that since Verse 4:3 stipulates equal
and just treatment of all wives, if the circumstances were such as to permit
polygamy, then permission of the first wife must be sought. This
permission, of course, would be in addition to the husband having the
means to provide maintenance for all persons concerned, before he may
take another wife."2 It is submitted that since all of these stipulations must
be met before entry into a polygamous relationship, polygamy is
permissible only in the narrowest of circumstances. If all the stipulations
set out in the Qur-an are to be met, then it would be almost impossible for
polygamy to exist. It is therefore submitted that the currently advocated
stance which benefits males is not actually contained in the Shari'ah.
Article 16(1) of the Convention continues by stipulating that there
must also be equality within the marital relationship. This concept, though,
seems in contradiction with Verse 4:34 of the Qur-an which has commonly
been interpreted contrary to the spirit of the actual Qur-anic text. It would
appear that the verse lends itself to much abuse where even its most liberal
reading cannot disguise the discrimination inherent within the provision.
Since this verse has been used as a justification for the domination of
women in almost all conceivable spheres, it is useful to investigate the
verse in its entirety.
(Part I) Men are the protectors
And maintainers of women,
Because Allah has given
The one more [strength]
Than the other, and because
They support them
From their means.
Therefore the righteous women
Are devoutly obedient, and guard
In [the husband's] absence
124 Parvez, MATALIB AL-FURQAN 345, (Lahore 1981), Vol. IV, in Engineer, supra
note 42, at 102-104.
125 Id.
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What Allah would have them guard.
(Part II) As to those women
On whose part ye fear
Disloyalty and ill-conduct,
Admonish them [first],
[Next], refiuse to share their beds,
[And last] beat them [lightly];
But if they return to obedience,
Seek not against them
Means [of annoyance]
For Allah is Most High,
Great [above you all].
Engineer argues that despite giving a contextual advantage to men
in spirit, the verses in the Qur-an taken together afford women a position
approximate to that of men.1 26 Even if one accepts this argument, it still
does not detract from the fact that men are given the job of protecting and
maintaining women, thus creating a relationship of dependency, which
naturally incurs inferiority. When, however, the first part of the verse is
read in conjunction with the second part, then discrimination against
women cannot be denied. The license to admonish women, to the extent of
being granted permission to beat them, albeit lightly, is highly
discriminatory and an invitation to violent abuse. 127 This verse also requires
a wife to show obedience to her husband which naturally implies
subservience. 121 Although the argument that abuse of this provision is due
to male jurists has some credibility, it should not be forgotten that the
ultimate source of Shari'ah, the Qur-an, orders women to obey their
husbands. Despite the magnification of subservience which has come to be
expected, this should not be overlooked, and from the words of the text one
cannot argue that equality for woman exists in this sphere.
Article 16(1) continues by stipulating that both parents have rights
126 Engineer, supra note 42, at 28.
17 The Women's Convention does not specifically outlaw domestic violence and
it is clear that it is, in fact, one of its weaknesses.
" Anderson, supra note 123, at 68., argues that this duty of obedience extends to
a wife forced to have sexual intercourse with her husband against her wishes, but
this is certainly a minority view. As with domestic violence, the Women's
Convention does actually prohibit marital rape.
[Vol. II
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and responsibilities towards the children of a relationship irrespective of
their marital status."' There clearly exists a problem regarding this
provision and its compatibility with Shari'ah. This mainly stems from the
phrase in the Article which places this duty on the parties "irrespective of
their marital status." This phrase includes not only married and divorced
parents, but also unmarried parents. The concept of unmarried mothers can
be seen as totally alien to Shari'ah codes, as intercourse outside marriage
is a grave sin, punishable by very severe penalties under Islamic law. 3
Although the wording of this Article was changed to pacify the Islamic
lobby, the conflict still has not been resolved. Unless there is a radical re-
interpretation or amendment to this clause, there is little chance of
reconciliation between them.
b. The Right to Divorce In the Convention and Shari'ah.
Article 16(1)c of the Women's Convention also stipulates equal rights for
both parties on the dissolution of marriage and this can be viewed as one
of the biggest obstacles in attempting to reconcile the 1979 Convention
with Shari'ah, as it has been implemented in practice. Unlike other
religious codes which tend to forbid divorce,' or else make gaining a
divorce very difficult, Islam is renowned for making divorce, amazingly
simple for men. The image normally portrayed of a talaq is that of the
husband simply uttering a divorce formula for any reason (or for no reason
at all,) and gaining his divorce. What tends to be overlooked, however, is
that while this is a valid talaq, this specific action is deemed to be not only
morally reprehensible, but also sinful. It should be noted that while divorce
is obtainable in Islam, it is not an encouraged activity. Since the family is
the cornerstone of society, and needs to be perceived as a strong, stable and
permanent institution. The Prophet is reported to have said "of all things
permitted by the law, divorce is the most hateful in the sight ofAllah." "'
While the Convention calls for the same rights and responsibilities
at the dissolution of marriage for both parties, Qur-anic injunctions on this
matter tend to take a patriarchal stance. In all, Islam recognizes five valid
types of talaq which are ranked in order from the most desirable formula
129 Women's Convention, Article 16(1)(d).
130 Unlawful sexual intercourse is a crime of Zina and is punishable by Hudood
The punishment which has evolved in practice, for such a crime, is 80 lashes.
13 In Shari'ah there is no generic equivalent to the term "divorce." Instead, the
dissolution of a marriage is known as a talaq.
13 Ali, supra note 29, at 1763 (quoting SUNAN, Volume XII 3.)
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to the most repugnant. This discussion will first look at the approved
methods of talaq, which incidentally, protect the rights of women, to those
which take little or no account of the woman's position. The latter have, on
the whole, been subject to very strong social pressures and the filtering
through of customs which have been successful in limiting restraints on the
rights to a talaq to very narrow grounds.'33
In the Qur-an, the husband is accorded many more duties and
responsibilities in the marriage relationship than the wife and therefore as
a form of compensation, he is awarded greater rights to obtain a talaq.
Verse 65:1 of the Qur-an sets down the "approved" formula for a talaq, and
any individual who exceeds their rights is warned of the "wrath of Allah,
which will await them in the afterlife",' Since the Prophet Mohammed did
not approve of talaq, a talaq which is revocable,'35 is perceived in an
approved light and is known as Talaq-al-Sunnah. A talaq which does not
follow the teachings of the Prophet is categorized as Talaq-al Bidah. Talaq-
al-Sunnah can be divided in to two categories:
i. Talaq-al-Ahsan. This is the most "approved" of
all forms of talaq. The talaq is announced by the husband, while the wife
is not menstruating. This period is known as tuhr, and forbids the man to
abstain totally from sexual intercourse with the wife. After a period of three
months the talaq becomes irrevocable, but up to any time during those
three months the talaq is still revocable. However, since only one talaq
pronunciation has taken place, the parties may, if they so wish, remarry
once the talaq has become irrevocable.'36
ii. Talaq-al-Hasan. This type of talaq follows the
procedure of Talaq-al-Ahsan, but when the first pronouncement is made
during a period of tuhr, rather than abstaining from sex with his wife, the
husband continues to sleep with her. These actions revoke the talaq
pronunciation, and the husband has to utter a second pronunciation during
3 Esposito, supra note 118, at 29.
"3 To gain his divorce, a husband must simply announce an intention to divorce
in his utterance, i.e. "I divorce thee."
"' In Islam a divorce is either revocable or irrevocable depending on the form it
takes.
36 In Islam if three divorce pronunciations have taken place, the wife must marry
someone else and consummate that marriage and then divorce this husband, before
she can re-marry her original husband.
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the next tuhr. This, however, is deemed to be the last revocable utterance,
for if or when the third pronunciation is made during the next tuhr, the
talaq becomes irrevocable. This limitation is imposed to stop the husband
continually dissolving his marriage, only to take his wife back, in order to
secure payment of some sort in return for granting her a talaq.
iii. Talaq-al-Bidah. While the above two forms of
talaq can be seen as "textbook" versions of a talaq, the type of talaq most
commonly followed, especially by the Hanafi school, is the triple
pronouncement in one sitting style of talaq known as Talaq-al-Bidah. This
type of talaq is most commonly associated by non-Muslims as the norm
with regard to Islamic divorces. This style of talaq, however, is an ancient
Arabic custom which has infringed and embedded itself in Islamic
tradition. No provision exists for it in either the Qur-an or Sunnah.37
Despite the lack of justification, this type of talaq is considered valid,138
albeit sinful.
While it is commonly presumed by many Muslims and non-
Muslims alike that only the husband has the right to dissolve the nikkah,
Verse 228 of Chapter 2 of the Qur-an, grants the right to dissolve the
nikkah to women.13 The right of the wife to a talaq, however, is qualified
by the restriction that men "have a degree over women," due to their greater
obligations and responsibilities during the marriage relationship.' Thus
while contextually men enjoy a wider ranging power to a talaq then
women, it is understood that this verse requires that the interests of women
should be protected at all times.' The type of talaq where the wife actually
proposes or contributes to the actual dissolution of the marriage is known
as Khul, or Mubaraah depending on the degree of the wife's wishes. If the
wife asks for the talaq it is known as Khul, if the talaq is agreed by mutual
consent it is known as Mubaraah Apart from these types of talaq a Muslim
wife may have a delegated right to a talaq, which is known as Talaq-i-
137 Esposito, supra note 118, at 32.
138 The triple talaq pronouncement in one sitting is not regarded as a valid
dissolution of a nikkah by many schools of thought, particularly the Ismaili's and
Ashari's.
19 The relevant part of the Qur-an, while laying down stipulations concerning
talaq, states the following: "And women shall have rights against them similar to
the rights against them, according to what is equitable."
140 Ali, supra note 29, at 99.
141 Id.
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Tawfid. In this type of talaq, when the nikkah is being drafted, a clause is
inserted which stipulates, that if certain stipulated conditions are violated,
then the wife can exercise her right to request a talaq. With this type of
contract, the husband may if he so desires grant the wife as great a right to
a talaq as he himself may enjoy, depending on the school ofjurisprudence
he follows. This delegation of rights to the wife, however, does not deprive
the husband of his own rights to dissolve the nikkah, if the wife breaches
the terms of the marriage contract. This may include grossly prejudicial
terms.
iv. Khul. The Khul, as requested by the wife, may
require her to return a part or all of her dower to the husband. The grounds
under which such a divorce may be granted vary tremendously between the
different schools of thought, but on the whole the Hanafi school tends to
be the most repressive of the Sunni schools of thought, with the Maliki
school being the most liberal. Throughout all four schools of thought,
however, the power of divorce granted to the wife is not as broad as that
which is granted to the husband.
The final type of talaq are those which are granted by judicial
process. 4 2 One of the most important consequences of this type of talaq,
is that it demonstrates the power of the Qadi (judge) to dissolve a marriage
on the petition of the wife. The grounds for a talaq of this nature available
to a wife again depend on the school of thought to which she belongs. The
Hanaft school is especially repressive. For instance, a practice which
evolved is where a woman cannot gain a divorce from a husband who has
deserted her until ninety years have passed from the husband's date of
birth.'43 In comparison to the Hanaft position, the Maliki rules in this
respect are very liberal, allowing a wife a talaq on any of the following
grounds:
i) cruelty towards the wife by the husband
ii) a refusal or inability on behalf of the husband to support
the wife
iii) desertion of the wife by the husband
iv) any grounds which would make continuation of the
marriage harmful to the interests of the wife
142 This type of talaq is known as Lia or Faskh.
141 This is a ground created by jurists for which there is no authority in the Qur-an
or Sunnah.
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v) the husband suffers from a serious disease or ailment
which would make continuation of the marriage
harmful to the health of the wife.1"
It can be seen that the actual Qur-anic injunctions concerning talaq
and the corresponding rights of the wife to request a dissolution of the
nikkah, while discriminatory against women, are not as prejudicial as many
of the practices which have evolved. The Convention, for its part, insists
upon the eradication of discrimination in all aspects of family life.
However, the Qur-an and the Sunnah are interpreted in the most liberal
manner possible, women are still not afforded equality with men with
regard to this right.
While one might hope that the end of a marriage contract might
lead to the eradication of injustices against women, the facts often
demonstrate to the contrary. Talaq, no matter which form it takes, does not
mean an end to the discrimination or partiality of provisions against women
who are regulated by Shari'ah. Once the actual divorce pronunciations have
been made, the wife has to observe a period of idaat.45 The main purposes
of this period are: (1) to establish paternity of any child which may have
been conceived in the last days of the marriage; and (2) as a period for
reconciliation between the aggrieved parties. 46 Although women are
prohibited from re-marrying during the period of idaat, men are not --
despite the objective of reconciliation.
c. The Rights of the Wife to Maintenance on Divorce Under
Shari'ah. The interpretation of Qur-anic verses and the Sunnah on
maintenance rights has been the most contentious and hotly debated area
144 Esposito, supra note 118, at 34. Also, Carrol notes that the grounds for a talaq
available to women, under Maliki jurisprudence, are very similar to those which
were granted to English women under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Lucy
Carrol, Muslim Women and Judicial Divorce, 5 ISLAMIC & COMP. L. Q. 226, 235
(1985),
14" The stipulation for idaat is laid down in Verse 65:6 of the Qur-an. During this
period the husband is obliged to provide for the wife in the same manner as which
he himself is living.
'4 Qur-an 4:35 requires the appointing of an arbitrator if there is a marital breach.
Engineer, supra note 42, at 126, quotes Hazrat Ali which says that an arbitrator
must be appointed for a valid talaq. This is supportive of those who claim that the
spontaneous talaq is not valid in Islam.
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of Islamic family law in recent years, and has led to a large amount of
jurisprudence from different jurisdictions. 147 This conflict, which concerns
the length of time for which the maintenance'48 should be paid and the scale
upon which it should be paid, 149 does not conflict directly with any specific
provision of the Convention. The wording of Article 16(1), however, can
be justifiably extended to include maintenance rights within its scope. The
Qur-anic verses which stipulate mata'a for the divorced wife are Verses
240 and 241 of Surah 2. Yet the verses do not stipulate either a period of
time, nor the scale upon which the mata'a is to be paid. The Qur-an only
stipulates that such payment "is a duty of the righteous."'50 Thus it would
seem that an individual who does not consider himself particularly
righteous is under no obligation to pay the divorced wife.' The practice
which has evolved, therefore, is that maintenance is only paid for the
period of idaat, which the wife must observe after divorce. After this
period the wife must rely on her relatives to sustain her, unless, of course,
she has sufficient resources of her own or has remarried. If none of these
options are available to her, the divorced wife is apparently in a difficult
situation. Obviously if she has custody of any children, then the husband
is under a duty to provide for them, and this would lead to some provision
for the wife. Verse 65:1 of the Qur-an does, however, provide some
protection for the divorcing wife, as it stipulates that she cannot be
"I Perhaps the most important case to have been decided was the Indian Supreme
Court decision of MOHAMMED AHMED KHAN V. SHAH BANOTE, 1985 (India S.C.
945). For an extensive study of the implications of this case, see Annika Rehman,
Religious Rights Versus Women's Rights in India, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 473
(1990).
' Ali, supra note 29, at 106, translates mata'a as maintenance. Yet no one can
really agree on an universal definition. MOHAMMED MAAMDUKE PICKTHALL, THE
HOLY QuRAN 44 (Delhi, 1980) interprets mata'a as "a provision of kindness." See
Engineer, supra note 42, at 131, for a discussion of the various different
interpretations of the word.
"9 Ali, supra note 29 translates m'arufas "reasonable scale," but this too is open
to a great many different translations.
o Qur-an 2:241
' This was in fact the argument of the husband in the Shah Bano case, who
claimed as an unrighteous Muslim he was under no obligation to pay maintenance
beyond the three month period of idaat. Incidentally this argument was not
accepted by the Supreme Court of India.
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removed from the marital home"' until her case has finally been decided.
During the period when the case is being considered by the Qadi the wife
cannot be evicted. 53 If a decision is reached and the wife is to leave the
home, Verse 65:2 obliges the husband to protect the interests of the wife at
all times and insists that the wife be released with kindness. The verse
futher stipulates that this act is to be witnessed by two pious persons, who
ensure that everything has been carried out in accordance with Qur-anic
injunctions on this matter. 5 4 These safeguards are feeble to say the very
least, relying on good nature at a time when hurt and irrationality usually
abound.
The argument put forward in the Shah Bano case that there is no
stipulation to pay mata'a beyond three months is, a forceful and strong
one. 5 Some commentators have made much of the fact that there is no
upper limit on the paying of mata'a, or the length of time for which it
should be paid.'56 If the situation is viewed objectively, however, and
taking into account the emotional situation it is improbable that
maintenance would be paid for any longer than is compulsory. The absence
of exact amounts is justifiable, as the husband's circumstances must be
taken into account when fixing an amount. The only earthly deterrent for
non-payment is an injunction against the husband issued by the Qadi. The
only penalty for injustices occurs in the after-life, and one does not
envisage many individuals taking this into account when deciding what
amount to pay and for how long.
While safeguards do exist within Shari'ah to ensure that the
position of the wife is protected on divorce, the lacunae within these
provisions leave ample room for abuse and manipulation by men. In the
West, while many divorced women are compelled to find work to
supplement their now reduced income, this option is not always open to
152 The wife can only be removed from the marital home if it belongs to the
husband. If it is her house, then the husband must leave.
"5 This only applies when a Qadi is involved.
Thus according to Qur-an 65:1, the wife would only leave the marital home if
alternative suitable accommodation is open to her.
I While Qur-an 2:228 does not clearly stipulate that maintenance must be paid
for the period of idaat, there is very little dispute that this is what is required. Three
months, however, is only the minimum, thus there is no obligation to pay beyond
this period.
16 Doi: Women, supra note 62, at 107.
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women living in countries which follow supposed Shari'ah codes. 5 7 It can
be seen from this very brief discussion of Shari'ah in this area, that the
average divorcing Muslim woman is not a happy one.
d. Custody of Children. Equality of access rights to and custody
of the children is one of the most contentious problems at the breakdown
of any marriage, and the ideal envisaged by the Women's Convention, is
one where both parties have equal rights to any children. Islam, however,
has been heavily influenced by the patriarchal society in which its origins
lay and the common practice followed by legal systems based on Shari'ah
reflect this position. As Anderson states, however, "the vast majority of
traditions (in this area) were later put in to circulation and are manifestly
spurious,"'sland a more liberal attitude can be seen in the actual Qur-anic
texts and citations of Hadith, than the practices which are commonly
followed in the name of Shari'ah.
In traditional Hanafi law, a divorced mother has an automatic right
to the custody of any children until the male child is seven and until the
female reaches puberty.'59 The future of the children once they have
reached puberty is open to a great deal of debate. The traditional practice
seems to be that the father gains permanent custody of the children, but
Verse 65:6 of the Qur-an, suggests that all concerned parties must sit down
and decide who is to have custody, once the children have reached the
relevant ages. 60 If this interpretation is correct, and there seems to be no
Hadith to contradict it,16' then this compares very favorably with the
position in many modem Western societies. However, within the nature of
Islamic society, this would result in the future of the children being decided
largely by the father, with some small input by the mother. With regards to
117 See the section on Employment.
'.. Anderson, supra note 23, at 55.
159 In this case, the age is set at nine, rather that fifteen (as with marriage).
160 The relevant part of the Qur-an reads as follows: " and if they suckle your
(offspring), give them their recompense: and take mutual counsel. Together,
according to what is just and reasonable" The practice where the children are
awarded to the mother is followed by the Shaft, Hanbli and Hanafi schools. The
Shi'ah stance is quite different, here the father gains automatic custody of any
males at the age of two and of any daughters at the age of seven.
I6 This position is supported by a Hadith recorded by Imam Muslim: Volume IV
at 195, and states that "the child is always of the mother." reprinted in Engineer,
supra note 42, at 30.
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custody of children, the Women's Convention stipulates that the interests
of the child are to be of paramount importance.162 If one accepts the
interpretation of Verse 65:6 as submitted above, then very little or no
conflict exists between Shari'ah as practiced by some Sunni schools and the
1979 Convention. If one looks, however, at the actual practices which have
evolved within the different sects, then the rights of the father are greater
than those of the mother, and in most instances the children have little or
no say. Despite these practices though, the Qur-anic injunctions, especially
Verse 65:6, which asks for the future of the child to be decided justly and
reasonably, will entail taking the child's interests into account. This would
not, however, be of paramount importance as envisaged by the Convention,
but simply one consideration among others.
e. Family Planning, The Women's Convention and Shari'ah. The
topic of family planning and especially the question of a right to an
abortion is one of the most delicate issues in the drafting of any human
rights treaty as evidenced by the fact that Article 16 of the Women's
Convention avoids mentioning the term, "abortion."163 The provision reads:
1. State Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family
relations...and....shall ensure, on a basis
of equality of men and women:
(e) The same rights to decide
freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their
children and to have access to the
information, education and
means to enable them to exercise
these rights.
162 Women's Convention, art. 16(l)(d).
'6 The stumbling block often originates from the definite Catholic prohibition on
contraception. This has recently been re-enforced by Pope John Paul II, who
reiterated the terms of the 1968 Humanae Vitae. THE GUARDIAN (London Aug. 10,
1993) at 19.
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Although it could be argued that a right to an abortion is inherent
within the provision, this is not widely accepted.'" The stipulation in this
Article is that both parties have an equal right to decide upon the number
and spacing of children. When this provision is read in conjunction with
Article 10(g) of the Convention, it entails an obligation upon states to
provide not only information and advice on family planning, but also the
resources and facilities for effective family planning. The question, thus,
is this: does Shari'ah conflict with this obligation, or does it allow such
provision for women ?
It is well known that the Qur-an, as such, does not prohibit or
permit the concept of family planning, and thus the application of the
doctrine "that which is not outlawed is permissible" seems to allow family
planning. This stance is supported by a Hadith, widely accepted as being
authentic, which authorizes the use of methods of contraception which
were known in seventh century Arabia,165 and it is on this basis that it may
be presumed that the use of modem methods of contraception is
permissible, provided that both parties agree to their use. 66 Although
traditional Shari'ah places no control on a woman's right to contraception,
in recent years (especially during the Iran-Iraq Gulf War of 1980-1988),
Islamic propagandists have been curbing women's rights to birth control in
order to supply man power for the front-line. 67 In fact, during this period,
the regime of Saddam Hussain severely reprimanded every woman of child
bearing age who did not have four children. 168 This attitude has not only led
4Many commentators have concluded that the right to an abortion is not intended
within the provision. See Meron, supra note 73, at 72
165 A Hadith recorded by Usma recalls that the prophet permitted withdrawal
before ejaculation in order to prevent conception. This then, was an accepted form
of contraception. Doi: Women supra note 62, at 130.
166 The major controversy stems around the use of surgical sterilization as a
method of contraception. Doi, id., explains that because surgical sterilization
amounts to a change in human physiology as created by Allah, it is forbidden.
Hussain, supra note 112, at 403, argues that a husband's duty of maintenance is
greater than his obligation to procreate, thus so long as he can satisfy his wife's
sexual needs, sterilization is permissible.
167 Haleh Afshar, Legal, Social and Political Position of Women in Iran, 13 INT'L
J. Soc. L. 47, 47 (1985).
168 In a radio address broadcast in Baghdad on May 4, 1986, President Hussain
stated that: "our motto must be that eachfamilyproducefive children, boys and
girls, as God wishes, and that the family which does not produce at least four
children deserves to be harshly reprimanded." Speech reproduced in IWRA W to
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to a curbing of family planning, but also a restriction of the right to an
abortion. As mentioned above, although abortions are not specifically
permitted in the Women's Convention, they are allowed in Shari'ah under
certain circumstances, provided that the fetus has not developed beyond the
119th day of development. 69
The question of the circumstances when an abortion is permissible
is open to debate. Imam Muslim deemed an abortion permissible at any
stage if it thwarts a threat to the life of the mother. Otherwise, an abortion
is only permissible up to the 119th day of the fetus's development, with the
decision to terminate the pregnancy to be taken by both the parties. 7 '
Modem jurists, however, especially in Iran since the revolution, have
argued that to allow an abortion at any stage without there existing a threat
to the life of the mother, amounts to a loss of faith in Allah's resources and
is thus not permissible."' It is submitted, however, that this position has
been advocated for political purposes and can be discounted on these
grounds.
The position under Shari'ah, on abortion is actually more
instrumental to women gaining equality with men than Article 16 of the
Womens Convention. It seems, that Shari'ah can, in fact, come within the
ambit of Article 23 of the Convention., which allows for measures which
are more conducive to women gaining equality with men than those
contained within the Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
A comparison of the substantive provisions of the Women's
Convention with the position advocated in the primary sources of Shari'ah
shows that with the exception of the right to an abortion and to a certain
extent political rights, the rights awarded to women under Shari'ah are
CEDAW Country Reports in SHARON LADIN: INERNATIONAL WOMEN'S
RIGHTS ACTRION WATCH, (1992) Footnote 7 at 9.
169 The time stipulation is based on a Hadith recorded by An Nawawi which states
that, "life is blown into a fetus by an angel at 120 days," thus to terminate a
pregnancy after this stage, is deemed to be murder by the majority ofjurists. ABU
MANTASIR IBN MOHAR' ALI, A GUIDE TO AN-NAWAWI's 40 HADITH 8 (1990).
170 Maitre Attiat E1-Kharboutly & Dr. Azziza Hussein, Law and the Status of
Women in the Arab Republic of Egypt, 8 COLuM. HUM. RTs. REV. 35, 49 (1976).
171 See Afshar, supra note 167, at 59.
1995]
44 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol.II
more restrictive than those awarded under the Women's Convention. To
simply argue, however, that in this regard Shari'ah should not be adhered
to by the Islamic states and that women living in those states should be
awarded the rights stipulated in the Women's Convention, would be a non-
starter. Not only do Islamic states reject such a proposal as the imposition
of cultural imperialism, they also point out that such a proposal is an
infringement of the right of each individual to practice and follow the
religion of their own choice. 72 Unfortunately, international human rights
treaties cannot be expected to succeed in resolving the conflict between
women's rights and religious rights, as human rights treaties are often the
result of political compromises. I would like to map out a two part strategy,
the first part of which would improve the situation on a relatively short
term basis, with the second proposal being more of a long term solution.
A. The Way Forward.
1. Education. In 1936, when the renowned Indian theologian
Fyzee was asked about the position of the Muslim female in society, he
replied "The unfortunate position of..Muslim women... is due to the fact that
women being illiterate are ignorant of their rights, and men being callous
choose to remain ignorant. " 73 It is unfortunate to say that almost sixty
years after this was stated, the same is as true today as it was then. But
while Fyzee only had the education of Muslim women in mind, my
proposals for education are wider.
It would seem to me that the most repressive, medieval and
reactionary element of the Ullamah have managed to convince national
172 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., Part No. 1, at 71; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 6, art. 18; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 2, 1952,213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 9; American
Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Josd, Costa Rica", Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 12; Organization of African Unity: Banjul Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, Jan 1982, reprinted in 21 .L. M. 58 (1982), art. 8.
In addition to these provisions, there also exists the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No 51, at 171,
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
" Fyzee, The Muslim Wife's Right of Dissolving Her Marriage, BOMBAY L. REP.
J. 123 (1936), as quoted by Carrol, supra note 144, at 238.
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policy makers that their position reflects the authentic Islamic culture. In
reality, Islamic doctrines accord women far greater rights than the practices
which have evolved and the widespread misconceptions which abound. In
addition to this educating of policy makers, it would seem that the masses
in Islamic states also need to be made aware of the true Islamic position on
issues regarding women, so that the politically weak regimes cannot
legitimize their rule at home by "defending" Islamic doctrines on the
international arena; or else, by advocating domestic legislation which
worsens the position of women as "Islamic," when their policies are in fact
contrary to the Islamic position.
This is why the education of men and women is vital, as it removes
the opportunity for many governments to legitimize their regimes and it
exposes the Ullamah supporting these regimes as individuals who are
politically, and not divinely, inspired. If such an education program seems
somewhat idealistic, at the very least the international community should
ensure that women in Islamic states are made aware of their rights under
Islamic laws, as this will improve the situation markedly. The political
embarrassment, which certain governments have suffered when educated
women have mobilized movements such as "Women Under Islamic Law,"
has sometimes been enough to cause them to retract or modify their
position. 74 On a short term basis, the rewards which this educational policy
may bring could be substantial. The extension of education to women is a
real problem because those regimes which suppress women, are also aware
that education will allow women to mobilize and reverse such policies. As
has already been illustrated, there is no ban in Shari'ah on education for
women and it is high time that this fundamental right was fully extended
to them. This is not to say, however, that some women themselves will not
object to legislation which improves their position, but through the process
of education attitudes cannot help but change.
2. Abrogation. While discussing Shari'ah and international human
rights standards, Abdullah An-Na'im has argued that in the search for
compatibility between Islamic legal theory and the Western standards of
international human rights, the West should not expect, "Muslim peoples
to examine and re-evaluate their cultural and philosophical stance.. unless
the developed countries are willing to examine and re-evaluate their own
'74 See Leites, supra note 27, at 278.
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cultural traditions."" With all due respect to this noted commentator, I do
feel that there is no need for the West to re-examine its cultural traditions,
so as to seek compatibility between international human rights standards
and the Qur-an and Sunnah. Professor An-Na'im's stance is based on the
presumption that one cannot expect a seventh century Middle Eastern
concept to accommodate an ideal which has its origins in eighteenth
century Europe and North America, yet I believe that not only can Shari'ah
accommodate and effectively implement international human rights
standards, but the principles upon which Shari'ah is based, are entirely
consistent with international human rights standards. Since some may find
this submission surprising, I will endeavor to explain my reasoning.
It is universally accepted in Islamic circles, that the verses in the
Qur-an were revealed, as the needs for them arose, thus the verses on
polygamy were revealed after the Battle of Uhad, when there were many
widows and orphans, i.e. Qur-anic verses were revealed to accommodate
the circumstances and the situation at that particular point in time, under
those particular circumstances, in that particular society. Therefore, it is
submitted that those Qur-anic verses which deal with social circumstances
were revealed and applicable to only that society. In addition to this, the
Qur-an repeatedly states that an individual cannot be excused for accepting
an interpretation of the Qur-an handed down by previous generations
without first contemplating it. 76 This means that each individual must
interpret the verses in the Qur-an on society, according to their own way
of thinking, i.e. reflecting their own sociological conditions. Although this
may seem radical, it does not in fact depart from the practices of some
states and individuals in the past. Historically, this is exactly what the
Ullamah of every previous generations have done. Also staunch advocates
of supposedly authentic Shari'ah, such as the Saudi-Arabians have accepted
that slavery has no place in modem society,"' yet the concept of slavery is
clearly and expressly permitted in the Qur-an. Therefore since the Saudi's
75 An-Na'im, Islam, Islamic Law and the Dilemma of Cultural Legitimacy for
Universal Human Rights, in ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 31, 49
(Claude Welch & Virgina Leary eds., 1990).
176 Qur-an 6:164 and 77:15
'"The Saudis have shown their support for the abolition of slavery by ratifying the
Slavery Convention, Sept. 25,1926, as amended by Protocol of Dec. 7, 1953, 212
U.N.T.S. 717 and 182 U.N.T.S. 5 1. In addition, the Saudis have also ratified the
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3.
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could only ratify the Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, by believing
in the abrogation of the Qur-anic verses on slavery, why cannot the verses
which discriminate against women now be abrogated?
It is also quite clear, that at the time the Prophet Mohammed
received the Qur-an, the intention was to guarantee women certain
minimum rights and not to award them equality on a par with men because
at that time, this was all that society could accommodate. The problem now
is that some of the recorded Hadith which reflected the sociological
conditions prevalent then, have been wrongly equated with theological
injunctions, applicable to all eras, even when the sociological conditions
upon which these injunctions were based have changed. But the general
principles in the Qur-an: tolerance, autonomy, justice, freedom,
consultation and equality, upon which much of this reasoning was based,
are in fact very similar to the principles upon which international human
rights standards are based. Although one cannot expect Muslims to change
their position overnight, a change in attitudes, and a mass realization that
Qur-anic verses reflect the social conditions in which they were revealed.
For this to occur, one must apply the principles upon which Qur-anic
injunctions are based, and not the literal word of the Qur-an, to the modem
era, is where our long term ambitions must lie. This change in attitudes,
however, is one which must be advocated by Muslims to Muslims,
otherwise the most reactionary element of the Islamic world will rebel
totally. At least Muslims advocating such a stance stand some chance of
being listened to and although it may seem that at the moment the prospects
of success are slim, given time I do believe this will prove to be the way to
resolve the commonly perceived conflict between not only Shari'ah and the
Women's Convention, but also, between Shari'ah and international human
rights standards as a whole.
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